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On the Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative 
Methodological Paradigms (Based on the Example 
of Content Analysis) 
Norbert Groeben and Ruth Rustemeyer 
1 The Metatheoretical Point of Departure: The Position of 
Content Analysis Between Monism and Dualism 
1.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Methods as the Operational Level of 
Monism and Dualism 
Within the field of psychology, it is possible to distinguish between two contrary concepts of 
science, or in the words of Prinz (1994, 3) between "two different scientific cultures" (cf. Snow 
1964). The difference between them emerges very clearly in the respective canon of methods 
they accept and propagate. On the one hand we have the so-called quantitative methods based 
on the classical scientific model for which the experiment is postulated as the via regia; on the 
other, so-called qualitative methods have been developed along the lines of the arts and the hu- 
manities, which above all start from the idea that a human being is an organism that generates 
meaning or sense (cf. Groeben 1986; 1991). Here, the "generation of meaning or sense" is un- 
derstood as the ability to produce signs and to communicate using these signs. It is certainly 
symptomatic that what is primarily mentioned as the explication of the "qualitative" method is 
the determination by the object that it presupposes. Here it becomes evident that the polarity 
between quantitative and qualitative methods is really only the operational level of the funda- 
mental metatheoretical positions known as monism and dualism. In this context, the monistic 
position defines the attributes of science primarily resp. solely from the methodological point of 
view and thus consists of the central postulate according to which one and the same (scientific- 
experimental) methodology constitutes all disciplines that deserve the name of "science" (hence 
"monism"). By contrast, dualism starts from the central assumption that scientific methodology 
should be based on the specific object of study of the individual discipline, in which case a 
minimum distinction has to be made between the different object domains of "nature" and 
"culture". Consequently, there are also at least two different concepts of science, with distinct 
metatheoretical goals, (i.e. "dualism"). 
Now psychology happens to be a typical area where this controversy between the two basic 
concepts and orientations of science takes place, since its object, mankind, belongs to both fields 
- nature and culture. It is in fact so prototypical that the very distinction between monism and 
dualism actually had its roots in psychology, in 1894 in fact, in the form of Dilthey's "Ideen iiber 
eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie" (Reflexions on a Descriptive Versus an 
Analytical Psychology; cf. 1968N). Although there is a relatively clear predominance of the 
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scientific-monistic position in the history of psychology in the 20th century, the dualist position 
has never quite disappeared and has remained a force in psychology - though at different levels 
of visibility. In parallel to this, there has always been a fierce controversy between the monistic 
and the dualistic orientation: from the diagnosis of a "Krise der Psychologie" (Crisis in Psychol- 
ogy) (Biihler 1927) via the various stages of the controversy between explanatory and interpre- 
tive (Verstehen) models of science (cf. Apel's historical sytematization, 1979) right down to the 
realization that there is a "permanent crisis" (by Jiitternann 1991). 
At fist sight, these basic metatheoretical controversies seem relatively remote from re- 
search practice. However, the tension between the two "cultures of science" they express cer- 
tainly does emerge also in the methodological dimension, which can be seen as the operational 
level of the fundamental metatheoretical conceptualizations and controversies. Thus, in parallel 
to the controversy about an adequate philosophy of science, we can also observe a tension be- 
tween quantitative and qualitative research methods, reflecting two very different paradigms for 
the acquisition of knowledge: the subject-object paradigm on the one hand and the subject-sub- 
ject paradigm on the other. The first of these implies the assumption that only the detached per- 
spective of the "third person" as an observer produces information that can be called scientific; 
the second contains the central postulate that it is above all the ability to show sympathetic un- 
derstanding (einfdhlendes Verstehen), an intuitive grasp or reconstruction of the inner perspec- 
tive of the (human) "object" that produces scientifically valuable data (Aschenbach 1992, 184). 
Here a distinction can still be made between the methodological phases of data collection and 
analysis. In this respect, the quantitative approach implies the claim of using standardized pro- 
cedures in collecting data (by using questionnaires, observation, experiments), whereas the 
qualitative approach refrains from standardization entirely or in part (cf. the narrative interview, 
participant observation, the biographical method, and so on). In the case of data analysis - and 
this is the derivation of the names of the two different orientations - the focus, on the one hand, 
is on quantitative processing (descriptive and inferential statistics), whereas, on the other, it is 
on interpretive and dialogue-based, hermeneutical processing (cf. Aschenbach 1992, 185; 
Scheele 1992). 
As to the relationship between quantitative and qualitative methodological paradigms, in 
principle, three metatheoretical positions have emerged from recent discussion: 
- The mutual exclusiveness of the two approaches: This position insists on the dichotomy be- 
tween monism and dualism, but tries to overcome the "unfortunate tendency to one-sided theo- 
retical imperialism of various kinds" (Graumann 1991. 5) whereby one's own position had al- 
ways been described as the only significant and useful one. One reason for these permanently 
"crisis-ridden" controversies was the repeated attempt to lay down a single, uniform orientation 
for the whole of psychology. According to this premise, a solution can be seen in accepting the 
mutual exclusiveness of the two methodological approaches and thus, logically, in splitting psy- 
chology into two disciplines: one being scientific-nomothetic and the other hermeneutical- 
idiographic, with the latter being more closely related to the social and cultural sciences (Prinz 
1994,5). 
- Pluralism of methods: However, the fact that man as the object of psychology belongs both to 
the sphere of nature and to that of culture may also give logical justification to the maintenance 
of psychology as a unified discipline that at the same time allows a pluralistic use of methods. 
The justification here is that it is only through this kind of pluralism of methods that the variety 
and complexity of the psyche can be covered. This expresses a fundamental conviction that (in 
psychology) there is not and can never be any such thing as a single method that does justice to 
its object; and this conviction is seen as the central prerequisite for a nonreductionist psychology 
(Graumann 199 1, l l ) .  
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- Integration of methods: However, the disadvantage of this kind of pluralism is that nonetheless 
individual researchers continue to believe that the methodological approach they happen to pre- 
fer (and master) is the most meaningful and correct one, and so forth. In this way, no real link is 
established between the two orientations, and thus there is no multiple-method coverage of the 
complex subject of psychology. In principle, this is also true of the application of the two meth- 
odological paradigms to different areas of psychology, e.g. the use of the quantitative 
(nomological) approach in particular for fundamental research and the qualitative (idiographic) 
approach especially for applied research with practical relevance (Prinz 1994). This kind of 
"additive link is not genuine integration in the sense of an equilibrium between and a synthesis 
of, different (and specifically qualitative and quantitative) methodological target ideas. 
This type of balanced synthesis of methodological standards taken from different scientific 
traditions is the guiding principle behind an integrated approach, which we will demonstrate 
here constructively using content analysis as a prototypical example. Content analysis proves 
well-suited for this task because its very point of departure is the objective dimension of man's 
ability "to generate sense and meaning" with which this essay opened. The main objects of con- 
tent analysis are human communication processes, which are described as being "the essential 
field of examination of the social sciences" (Lisch and Kriz 1978, 29). However, the problem of 
providing a systematic-intersubjective description of these communication processes is not to be 
underestimated. As the psychology of text processing has shown in the last three decades, the 
process of understanding texts not only consists in decoding the linguistic information they 
contain, but this information is also connected to the linguistic and world knowledge the recipi- 
ent possesses, so that the resulting product of understanding is always a merging of text-gener- 
ated and recipient-generated information (i.e., of bottom-up and top-down processes: 
Frederiksen 1977; cf. also Bock 1978; Ballstaedt et al. 198 1; Groeben 1982). Thus, in the end, 
content analysis is a way of systematizing the normal, everyday understanding of texts in terms 
of two defining goals: on the one hand, in terms of content, to achieve an overview of the text's 
meaning that reduces its complexity and on the other, in terms of method, to guarantee intersub- 
jective agreement (by eliminating the dangers of distortion). 
1.2 The History of Content Analysis and its Position Between Herme- 
neutics and Empiricism 
This synthesis of substantive and methodological goals is also reflected in the history of content 
analysis, which started to develop primarily as an analysis of political propaganda (beginning 
with Lasswell 1927) (with special emphasis on the 1940s and 1950s: cf. the overview given by 
Larnnek 1989, 171ff.; Lisch and Kriz 1978, 15ff.; Merten 1983, 34ff.). Starting from mass 
communication, journalism, and political science, content analysis then went on to acquire a 
considerable reputation in sociology, educational science, and not least in psychology, as shown 
by the two constituent conferences, in 1941 at the University of Chicago (Wapels 1941) and in 
1955 in Montecello (cf. Pool 1959). Lasswell's classic formulation: "Who says what in what 
channel to whom with what effect?" (Lasswell 1948) makes it clear that this attempt at sys- 
tematization of everyday understanding is always subject to two opposing tendencies: a ten- 
dency toward intersubjective systematization (as an approximate means of achieving 
"objectivity") is counterbalanced by the attempt to draw rather extensive (pragmatic) conclu- 
sions or inferences about the participants in communication in order to make social-scientific 
findings of the greatest possible relevance. Here, too, in principle, there is a parallel to everyday 
communication, in which it is not only (linguistic) information (contained in the communication 
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process) that is received, but in which such information is also "understood" as indicative of 
characteristics referring to individuals and situations - and here this "understanding" clearly 
consists in conclusions and inferences. Now, the scientific systematization of this understanding 
is quite naturally very interested indeed in "objectifying" such conclusions, since the formulation 
and testing of (inferential) hypotheses is one of the most important goals of the scientific enter- 
prise (as a system of explanation and prognosis) (cf. Breuer 1990; Prim and Tilmann 1973). 
However, the whole question revolves around the extent to which such conclusions can be 
conceptualized and systematized as part of content analysis - or whether that is asking too much 
of this "method of understanding". This problem of whether to choose a narrower or a broader 
conceptualization of content analysis is also reflected in the definitions of it that have been pro- 
posed so far. An example of a narrow concept of content analysis that primarily concentrates on 
a discerning (verstehende) description of meaning is surely to be seen in Friih's definition (1989, 
23): "content analysis is an empirical method for the systematic and intersubjectively recon- 
structible description of content-based and formal characteristics of communication." In contrast 
to this, the explication given by Mayntz et al. (1974, 151) represents the broad line of interpre- 
tation which regards content analysis as a method that "identifies and describes the linguistic 
characteristics of a text objectively and systematically, in order to draw conclusions about non- 
linguistic characteristics of people and social aggregates" (cf. Lamnek 1989, 167; also Merten 
1983, 23ff.). Between these two extreme poles there is a continuum of widely differing propos- 
als for a definition, all of which nonetheless do see content analysis as a link between hermeneu- 
tics and the empirical sciences (cf. Rustemeyer 1992, 23) or rather as "a connecting link be- 
tween qualitative and quantitative paradigms" (Lange and Willenberg 1989, 178). Obviously 
understanding (Verstehen) is also the central methodical procedure in the hermeneutical sci- 
ences, even if in a less (or rather different) systematic form than in content analysis. For herme- 
neutics, the so-called hermeneutical circle is the central methodological concept, which does not 
actually describe a logical type of circularity as much as it does a pragmatic circuit (Lamnek 
1988, 65ff.). This circuit refers, on the one hand, to the relationship between level of expecta- 
tion and text comprehension, and on the other, to the relationship between individual elements 
and overall meaning, for which hermeneutics has - in various ways - developed a process-based 
feedback loop involving such processes as mutual enabling, deepening and further specification 
(cf. Betti 1967; Coreth 1969; Danner 1979; summary in Larnnek 1988, 68ff.; Mayring 1990, 
27ff.). In the history of the field of text analysis, the hermeneutical interpretation of literary texts 
plays a very prominent role, and here the "analytical description of the text and its discerning 
interpretation ... represent an inseparable unity" (Friih 1989, 59). The biggest methodological 
difference between this and the (falsification-oriented) empirical paradigm is to be seen in the 
fact that here an "interpretation that is held to be subjectively correct ... is formulated, and then 
a search is made for as much evidence as possible to confm it" (ibid., 58; cf. also Groeben and 
Landwehr 1991, 146f.). A version of the so-called qualitative social science paradigm that is 
relatively close to this method of hermeneutical understanding can be seen in "objective herme- 
neutics" (cf. Oevermann et al. 1979; 1983; for a discussion of it in this context, see, for example, 
Lamnek 1989,213ff.). 
On the other hand, taking into account its systematic approach, content analysis is closer to 
the methods of the empirical sciences. Here, as a rule, linear sequences for proceeding are de- 
termined that are (to be) implemented in the same way by all possible (competent) researchers. 
This does not exclude circular multiple runs of any given procedure, for which once again inde- 
pendence from the (individual) research subject is the main target criterion. Behind this, there is 
the idea of measuring as an ideal, by means of which empirically established relationships (as 
observable qualities of reality) are to be transformed into a data structure that represents a ho- 
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momorphic "reproduction" of these relationships (cf. Friih 1989, 23ff.; Merten 1983, 91ff.). 
This does not necessarily imply a measurement at the ordinal- or interval-scale level, but (as, for 
example, in content analysis) certainly permits a purely categorical classification (e.g., of aspects 
of meaning at the level of the nominal scale). After all, this also applies in the same way to es- 
tablished observation systems, such as the Bales scale, which is used by researchers to classlfy 
interaction within group structures in relation to their constructiveness and destructiveness (cf. 
Bales 1972). As Groeben (1986, 145ff.) has made clear in a differentiated discussion, such 
scales are only considered to be "pure observation of behavior" because the interpretive compo- 
nents that are certainly present here have recourse to universally shared aspects of meaning (so 
that this recourse - especially in a behaviourist-type methodology - went unnoticed for a long 
time). Seen from this perspective, classical observation methods in empirical science are cer- 
tainly not characterized by a complete exclusion of aspects of meaning. The difference between 
hermeneutical and empirical methods is to be seen much more in the complexity of the thematic 
perspectives of meaning as well as of the resulting systematic quality with which the method of 
understanding "reproduces" these meanings. In the case of empirical methods of observation, in 
this respect we are dealing with the standardized diagnosis of meanings realized through com- 
munication (which represent a manifestation of universal dimensions of meaning). Contrary to 
this, at its point of departure, hermeneutical interpretation is a subjective explication of aesthetic 
or pragmatic potential meanings (whereby the concept of potentiality describes a deep structure, 
which in principle leads to both individual and also inconclusive reconstructions). Content 
analysis stands between these two poles and at a comparably basic level of abstraction can be 
described as an intersubjective reconstruction of aspects of meaning in communication, although 
the potentiality aspect also points to the inclusion of deep structural dimensions the description 
of which (as communicable aspects of meaning) is in principle indicated as being conclusive, 
namely, in terms of an intersubjective, systematic way of proceeding. This status of content 
analysis, at the point of intersection between these two contrary scientific traditions (the herme- 
neutical and the empirical one), is also reflected in the history of its own inception. For here we 
find two extremely different, concrete expressions of method that have become known as 
"quantitative" as opposed to "qualitative" content analysis and which respectively draw their 
background arguments more from the empirical or the hermeneutical paradigm. 
2 Prototypes for Systematizing Understanding 
2.1 Classical "Quantitative" Content Analysis: Narrow Inferences Within 
Understanding in the Form of a Fixed Canon of Strict Rules 
Today, the name and the concept of what is usually called "quantitative" content analysis can be 
traced back to Berelson's definition (1952, 18): "Content analysis is a research technique for the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" 
(cf. also Friih 1989,23; Lamnek 1989, 180; Mayring 1990, 11). Under the "content of commu- 
nication", Berelson understands "that body of meanings through symbols (verbal, musical, pic- 
torial, plastic, gestural) which makes up the communication itself' (Berelson 1952, 13). The 
focal elements of this approach are then designated by the terms "objective", "systematic", 
"quantitative", and "manifest". Specifically describing the content of communication as 
"manifest" explicitly excludes all inferences over and beyond the respective content of the signs 
(cf. also Merten 1983, 55); hence, even in the semantic (or respectively the syntactic) dimension 
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of the relevant communication content this implies a relatively far-reaching limitation to what is 
directly stated, to the "surface structure" of communication. In the course of time, this exclusion 
of "latent" meaning and content has led to a controversy with the advocates of socalled 
"qualitative" content analysis (see below). However, for Berelson's classical approach, this limi- 
tation to manifest communication content is mainly to be seen as a consequence, which should 
make the implementation of the central methodological criteria "objectivity, systematics, and 
quantification" possible. Here "objectivity" is understood as the aforementioned (cf. 1.1) inter- 
subjective testability and agreement (cf. Lamnek 1989, 18ff.) that are to be guaranteed by the 
systematic nature of the content analysis approach. In principle, this systematic approach in- 
volves dividing up the text to be analyzed into individual parts, with regard to which it is then 
easier and more reliable (on the basis of intersubjective agreement) to ascertain whether they 
contain certain (theoretically defined) aspects of meaning or'not. The basic principle of the con- 
tent analysis approach thus consists in "systematically inspecting the individual parts of a text to 
see whether, and if so, how they can be allocated to certain predefined aspects or categories of 
meaning" (Rustemeyer 1992, 13). Hence, the two most important methodological problems of 
content analysis involve the determination of the sections of text to be categorized (the problem 
of agreeing on the text units) and the explication of the thematic aspects of meaning in a so- 
called system of categories. 
In relation to these units, classical content analysis distinguishes between the recording unit, 
the unit of analysis, and the context unit: the "recording unit" is taken to mean the selection of 
those texts that are to be included in the respective content analysis. For instance, if the fre- 
quency of stereotyped attitudes (prejudices) against women in science fiction dime novels is to 
be investigated, the population of all possible texts consists of all science fiction novels or sto- 
ries that have so far been produced as dime novels. In the light of the recording unit, it then has 
to be decided which concrete texts should be selected as the text (corpus) for the respective 
content analysis; this is therefore a problem of random sample selection for which the usual 
models used in the methodological theories of the social sciences, such as random selection, 
stratified and quota selection, and so on can be used (cf. Rust 1981, 93ff.; Lisch and Kriz 1978, 
59ff.; Merten 1983.280ff.). The "unit of analysis" or "coding unit" describes the breakdown of 
the text to be analyzed into individual parts that can then later be subsumed under the respective 
(explicated) categories of meaning. Depending on the question, these units of analysis can be 
determined either according to a more formal or a more content-oriented approach (cf. Lamnek 
1989, 181f.; Rustemeyer 1992, 74ff.): examples of formally defined units of analysis would be 
words, sentences, sections of text, and so forth; units defined according to content would be 
symbols, values/value judgements, topics (change of), ideas, and so on (cf. Rust 1981, 107ff.). 
As a rule, the "context unit" is understood to mean the longer section of text (as compared to 
the "unit of analysis") to which the coders can and should have recourse when allocating the 
concrete analysis units to the respective categories, in order to avoid errors of understanding. 
For instance, when the (more formal) sentence is chosen as the "unit of analysis", you usually 
cannot tell from the individual sentence whether it is meant ironically or not; the context unit 
then indicates the longer section of text that should be considered in order to decide this ques- 
tion (and thus disambiguate the leeway for interpretation that quite naturally always exists in 
connection with text analysis; cf. Schlagell 1989,254; Holsti 1969; Friih 1989, 110). 
However, as is generally agreed, the real core of a content analysis is the system of catego- 
ries in which the relevant dimensions or aspects of meaning are explicitly and specifically estab- 
lished. The optimal case of theory-directed research here certainly involves deriving the relevant 
perspectives of meaning from a theoretical question or hypothesis in a deductive manner (cf. 
Rustemeyer 1992,43ff.); however, there is a fuzzy transition here to explorative studies that are 
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mainly characterized by the inductive discovery of hypotheses, so that quite often we find 
meaningful combinations of the deductive and inductive generation of hypotheses (ibid., 50ff.). 
The decisive factor is that the definition of the respective categories should be regarded and 
properly structured as an operationalization of theoretical questions or hypotheses as well as of 
the main variables they contain (ibid., 62ff.; cf. also Friih 1989, 80ff.; Merten 1983, 215ff.). It 
has proved valuable to use three steps for practical implementation here, i.e., namingldefining 
the category, explication/elaboration (especially of the limits of categories), and positive as well 
as negative examples (Rustemeyer 1992, 93ff.). Here it can also be necessary to take into ac- 
count different levels of abstraction in the dimensions and aspects of meaning by introducing su- 
per- or subcategories (cf. Rustemeyer 1992, 100ff.). 
Quantification as a characteristic in this context means that the intersubjective agreement 
between various coders in allocating the individual sections of text (units of analysis) to the 
thematic aspects of meaning (categories) is calculated in quantitative terms (cf. Rustemeyer 
1992, 114ff.; Lisch and Kriz 1978, 88ff.). This coefficient of agreement makes it possible to 
assess the usefulness of the system of categories that has been developed and, if necessary, to 
improve on it in steps providing greater precision. However, within the classical concepts 
(developed by Berelson and others) quantification above all also means that the results of the 
process of categorization have to be summed up and processed in quantitative terms according 
to the theoretical question or hypothesis and move towards an "overall description of the 
meaning(s) of the text" (Rustemeyer 1992, 21ff.): this begins with simple frequency analyses 
(for instance, a frequency analysis on how often which themes are referred to in the text cor- 
pus), proceeds to contingency analyses that weigh up the relative connections existing between 
certain themes (e.g., how often a concrete prejudice against a certain minority is connected with 
which political attitude), and advances fmally to more complex forms of field-of-meaning, sym- 
bol, and evaluation analysis (cf. Lisch and Kriz 1978, 127ff.; Rust 1981, 141ff.; Merten 1983, 
185ff.). 
Now actually this quantification is really only the consequence and manifestation of the de- 
cisive characteristic of the systematic approach that it logically grows out of. This systematic 
approach is characterized by the standardized course of investigation briefly described here 
(determination of units, explication of categories, coding, and so on) (cf. Friih 1989, 100ff.). 
The flexibility of content analysis is to be seen in the fact that, depending on the question and 
the text corpus to be analyzed, a specific system of categories has to be developed; but apart 
from this flexibility, the systematic procedure described here was designed as a constant appli- 
cation of rules in the classical approach to content analysis. That is also the reason why it was 
recently possible to try and devise an algorithmic elaboration for these rules for certain units of 
analysis, possible categories, and so on. This elaboration leads to models of computer-assisted 
content analysis, the discussion of which would go beyond the scope (and space limitations) of 
this essay (here, see Lisch and Kriz 1978, 105ff.; Merten 1983, 334ff.; Lissmann 1989,241ff.). 
Thus, from today's point of view, the characteristics of objectivity, systematics, and quanti- 
fication in Berelson's classical definition can be subsumed under the overall heading of 
"strictness of rules". Moreover, the term "manifest content" is no longer optimal by today's 
standards. After all, the psychology of text processing in connection with the problem of context 
discussed above makes it absolutely clear that the classical concept of content analysis cannot 
involve concentrating on the linguistic "surface" in the sense of what is directly or literally ex- 
pressed. Obviously, so-called quantitative content analysis (e.g. as in the case of indirect figura- 
tive speech acts) also involves the "depiction" of the supposed meaning (as in the example of 
irony above). As the psychology of text processing has proved, in principle there is no such 
thing as an inference-free understanding of the text (see 1.1 above); naturally this also applies to 
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the classical concept of content analysis. Consequently, we should get away from the term 
"manifest content", which, as has been mentioned, above all means the exclusion of broader 
inferences as to the author of the text, its recipient, and the communication situation (cf. Merten 
1983, 55f.). At the most, what is involved is the scope of the inferences implied when categoriz- 
ing meanings; here, classical content analysis according to Berelson and his successors certainly 
represents the (rather extreme) end of the spectrum where "decoding" is as free from inferences 
as possible. In our view, so-called "quantitative content analysis" according to Berelson and his 
successors - when considered in today's terms - is more adequately described as a concept in- 
volving strict rules of narrow inferences. 
2.2 The Opposite End of the Spectrum: "Qualitative Content Analysis" - 
Broad Inferences with Adaptive Use of Rules 
In the end, this dimension of inferences (and the range they cover) is also at the center of the 
controversy between so-called quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Kracauer, who first 
formulated the term and concept of qualitative content analysis as a criticism of the dominant 
"quantitative" version in 1952, uses the opposition between "manifest" and "latent" meaning: 
qualitative content analysis above all tries to concentrate on "latent" aspects of meaning (as ex- 
pressed in inferences about the author, communication, situation, recipient, and so forth), since 
the units of analysis are not determined systematically and the inquiry is not limited to prede- 
termined aspects and perspectives of a question, but should make possible the discovery of hid- 
den elements of communication (in a more holistic, interpretative way of proceeding) which are 
then only grouped together in categories as a result of the analysis (cf. Rust 1981, 187ff.). This 
countervailing concept of "qualitative" content analysis was reconstructed and refined in the 
ensuing period under the heading of very different dimensional characteristics (cf. Mayring 
1990, 16ff.), such as the scale level of the basic measurement (nominal versus ordinallinterval 
scale), the number of analyzed texts (individual case versus representative random sample), the 
status of the hypothesis (heuristics versus testing of hypotheses), and so on. All these aspects 
are in the final analysis only to be seen as consequences of the central clash of "latent versus 
manifest", which, as explained, primarily represents the scope of inferences made in processing 
the text. So in this respect the assessment is justified that so-called qualitative content analysis is 
the polar opposite to so-called quantitative content analysis, representing a form of analytical 
procedure that makes the broadest possible inferences. 
However, so little is actually defined here in terms of methodological systematics (and this 
also applies to Kracauer's explication cited above) that it is possible to think up a whole range of 
different variants to fill out this concept. Hence, Lamnek (1989, 192) distinguishes between 
another two (sub)poles in qualitative content analysis: one form that differs from so-called 
quantitative analysis because of the lack of a quantitative assessment, though its determination 
of units of analysis and categories of meaning is comparable. By contrast, in the other form of 
qualitative content analysis, suitable perspectives of meaning (appropriate for the respective 
text) are first developed in the framework of the analysis, without any prior determination of 
units of analysis and categories. He includes Mayring's (1990) concept of qualitative content 
analysis in the first category; to be precise, Mayring above all propagates increasing the range of 
inclusion of context (including other texts and not just parts of the text to be analyzed), but 
apart from that, his approach shows a relatively marked similarity to the structure of 
"quantitative" content analysis. However, this structural similarity to narrow inferences and 
strict rules is not to be found in the second type of approach subsumed by Lamnek under the 
316 Norbert Groeben and Ruth Rustemeyer 
overall heading of qualitative content analysis. According to Lamnek, this type is characterized 
by the "openness" of its approach, according to which "the material to be interpreted is not 
'treated' using theoretical categories which are developed beforehand by the researcher and are 
thus extrinsic to the text" but which "grow out of the material itself as an interpretation" 
(Lamnek 1989, 194). By way of example, Lamnek mentions "objective hermeneutics" as devel- 
oped by Oeverrnann et al. (1979; 1983). which represents a deep hermeneutical approach that is 
largely equivalent to the "hermeneutical circle" (see section 1.2 above) in its structural orienta- 
tion. From the methodological point of view, the conclusion can be drawn here that the first 
type of "qualitative content analysis" according to Lamnek is above all characterized by broad 
inferences in the explication of categories (moving towards "latent" aspects of meaning in the 
text), whereas the second type is characterized by a premium on openness, understood as vari- 
ability of rules (i.e., the avoidance of prior determination as regards units of analysis, systems of 
categories, and so on). If the intention is to consider "qualitative" content analysis (including in 
its historical sense, as in Kracauer; see above) as the polar opposite to the classical concept of 
quantitative content analysis with its narrow inferences and strict rules, then the most useful 
complementary explication of its characteristics would seem to us to be found in the terms 
"broad inferences" and "rule variability". 
However, we are not dealing here with contradictory opposites, at least with regard to nar- 
row or broad inferences, but in fact more with the two endpoints of a continuum. For inferences 
are unavoidable in understanding a text; thus the only significant question is that of the optimum 
or rather sufficiently justified "scope" of these inferences. Accordingly the clash between 
"manifest and latent contents" does not describe mutually exclusive alternatives as much as a 
polarization between interpretive emphases that practically call out for integration. For this very 
reason, the past few decades have witnessed repeated arguments (for) doing just that (Bessler 
1972, 64f.; Rust 1981, 187ff.; Lisch and Kriz 1978, 46f.; Groeben 1987, 3ff.; Lamnek 1988, 
229ff.; Friih 1989, 36f.; Huber 1989, 34ff; Rustemeyer 1992, 144). Even so, the controversy 
between "quantitative" and "qualitative" content analysis is continuously being revived (e.g., see 
the Educational Researcher from 1983 to 1988 as well as the special issue of Unterrichtswissen- 
schaft (The Science of Teaching): cf. Huber 1989,35; Lange and Willenberg 1989, 173). In the 
final analysis, this is probably connected with the whole dimension of rule strictness versus rule 
variability, where there certainly are not any comparable continuous transitions linking the two 
extreme poles; consequently, integration or rather optimization is clearly more difficult. At all 
events, the persistant tendency of the controversy to flare up again and again indicates its con- 
nectedness to more fundamental conflicts about methodological goals, which, for this reason, 
we will (briefly) analyze in the following section. 
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3 (Methodological) Goal Criteria for a Constructive Approach 
to Content Analysis: Adjustment of Rules with Explicit 
Elaboration of Inferences 
3.1 Methodological Stringency Versus Adjustment to the Object as Tar- 
get Criteria for the Two Prototypes of Content Analysis? 
The deeper clash underlying both the polarity between strict and variable rules and the conflict 
between narrow and broad inferences can be Seen in the general tension between two different 
preferences or relative emphases, which is not lirnited to content analysis, but also exists be- 
tween so-called quantitative and qualitative social research (Lamnek 1988; 1989), and even 
between the rnonistic and dualistic concepts of science (cf. Groeben 1986). What is at stake here 
is whether the respective methodological concept places more emphasis on systernatics (and 
thus on the certainty of the evidence) or on the appropriate adjustment to the object (and thus 
on the content-based substantiality of the evidence). The "qualitative paradigm" (Lamnek 1988, 
21ff.) strongly advocates the position that "appropriateness with regard to the object" should be 
"taken more seriously than systernatics" (Mayring 1990, 102), which implies criticism of the 
classical "quantitative" paradigm in this way. The predominance of method in the orientation of 
the latter is criticized as a "restriction of experience" (Lamnek 1988, 8) that runs the risk of 
mistaking "epiphenomena for the thing itself' (ibid., 9), of "objectivizing" the human subject in 
an inadmissible rnanner (ibid., 14f.) and thus creating a (hierarchically structured) "distance be- 
tween the researcher and his object" (as the human "object" of research; ibid., 18). By contrast, 
the position advocating the prevalence of the (human) object argues for openness, both in the 
sense of transparency with the probands and in terms of flexibility concerning the research set- 
ting and the rnethods to be used (ibid., 22, 27ff.). It is argued that this would lead to a position 
where research as a cornmunicative process can do justice to mankind's reflectivity as the object 
of knowledge (ibid., 23ff.). Here, the prograrnrnatic goal is "adjusting the method to the object 
and not vice versa" (ibid., 97). 
However, turning these preferences into a dichotorny is surely unproductive since and inso- 
far as this would entail sacrificing all rnethodical systematization (and thus the certainty of the 
evidence to a large extent). To our mind, this in any case occurs whenever operationalizations 
(e.g., also the explication of categories) are cornpletely rejected, as within the qualitative para- 
digm (and in content analysis), "because the direction of attack is wrong: not from theory via 
operationalization to empiricisrn but frorn social reality to theory" (Lamnek 1988, 140); or when 
a "concept of emerging objectivity" is used, according to which "objectivity arises by rneans of 
the analysis, ... out of the subjectivity of the interacting parties" (ibid., 173), without its genesis 
being methodically explicated and systematically secured. In this case the classical scientistic 
critique is justified in its clairn that this largely leaves unanswered how intersubjectivity is to be 
guaranteed and how hypotheses are to be tested as to their validity in the process of research 
(Lamnek 1988, 123). It follows frorn this that neither by adopting a rigidly methodical approach 
nor by giving exaggerated prevalence to the object we are put in a position to generate both a 
high degree of substantial and reliable knowledge. What must be aimed at is genuine interaction 
between methods and the object (cf. in general, Groeben 1986, 25ff.; specifically on content 
analysis, Groeben 1987, 13ff.; Huber 1989, 40ff.). This means, for instance, that "openness" in 
the sense of transparency and (the justified) explication (of both theoretical and methodological 
postulates) is meaningful, warranted and desirable; however, this does not irnply "openness" in 
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the sense of unlimited variability of procedure, which would virtually exclude any methodical 
systematic approach and thus preclude the possibility of reaching results of general validity. In 
recourse to the two dimensions previously established as central to content analysis, namely 
narrow versus broad inference and rule strictness ("constancy") versus rule variability, the fol- 
lowing guiding idea emerges for achieving the envisioned interaction between object and meth- 
ods: on the level of inferences, those inferences established when working out a system of cate- 
gories should be elaborated under all circumstances and, above all, also be justified in relation to 
the broad context of conclusions that is airned at; on the level of methodicai rules, the essential 
target of systematics should be adhered to, but an adjustment in the sense of a mutual fit be- 
tween the object and the system of rules should be aimed at, i.e.. an "adjustment of rules" in the 
twofold sense of the genitivus subjectivus and objectivus should be attempted as an adjustment 
of the rules to the object as weii as an unavoidable adjustment of the object to the rules. An ap- 
proach to content analysis that is capable of overcoming the absurd alternative between preva- 
lence given to method and prevalence given to the object will, in general terms. be characterized 
by an adjustment of rules with explication of the unavoidable inferences. In the following sec- 
tion, we shail at least try to sketch in the detailed implications of this with regard to classical 
criteria, such as objectivity, reliability, validity, and so On. 
3.2 Adjustment of Rules: Objectivity, Reliability, Transparency, and 
Flexibility 
It is certainly true that the goal of rule adjustment already starts with the explication of the initial 
hypothesis during the methodical procedures involved in content analysis. As already elaborated 
above (2.1), arriving at a "deductively" derived hypothesis on the basis of explanations that have 
previously been tested is the ideal case for theory-driven research (including research in the field 
of content analysis). However, prior inductive exploratory studies are also quite legitimate if 
there are no such confirmed explanations, and this especially includes the combination of de- 
ductive and inductive formulation of the hypotheses, in order to obtain a composition of dimen- 
sions and perspectives that are as relevant as possible in relation to the respective field of objects 
(e.g., texts) (for greater detail, See Rustemeyer 1992, 43, 55ff.). This kind of combination of 
deductive and inductive heuristics gives clear expression to the flexibility of the whole proce- 
dure, and at this particular point but not only there, this very flexibility naturally requires 
"disclosing the procedure" (Früh 1989, 38) so that the respective concrete process is recon- 
structible and testable. In general terms it should be noted here that in principle (compared with 
some of the rnisleading wording contained in the "qualitative paradigm") "transparency" is not 
(only) to be understood as reconsiructibility as a means of conveying plausibility but must mean 
testability in the sense of the possibility to control the methodological procedure. 
As a rule this also implies that objectivity andlor reliability must be obtained according to 
the classical concept of explicit testing of intersubjectivity, using several categorizing processes 
and their (quantifying) evaluation in relation to agreement. In so doing, first of all, a basic dis- 
tinction can be made between intracoder and intercoder reliability (cf. Bessler 1972, 72f.). 
where intracoder reliability is checked by repeating the categorizing process with the same 
coder, and intercoder reliability is tested by calculating the agreement between the results of 
classification in categories by (at least) two coders. The coefficients of agreement (see also 2.1 
above) discussed and suggested in the literature on content analysis are usually based on the 
testing of intercoder reliability (cf. Lisch and Kriz 1978, 84ff.; Merten 1983, 303ff.; Rust 1981, 
116ff.). Due to the methodical structure of the process and since it is only possible in the case of 
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content analysis to test reliability by means of this intersubjectivity of the classification in cate- 
gories, here, the methodological evaluation criteria for objectivity and reliability virtually coin- 
cide, which is why the relevant agreement coefficients are described as a test both of objectivity 
and of reliability. Seen from the viewpoint of rule adjustment, here it is above d the discussion 
of a practical problem that is relevant, one which has largely been dealt with unfairly in the lit- 
erature so far, i.e., that of finding a match between the determination of the units of analysis and 
the explication of categories. For instance, the units of analysis must be big and complex enough 
to allow certain (more far-reaching) inferences to be made (see below), but should not be so 
comprehensive that no sufficient intercoder agreement can be obtained (for greater detail, see 
Rustemeyer 1992.83ff.). In connection with the general idea of flexibility as a goal, in complex 
content analyses this maxim quite often leads to a situation in which specific units ought to be 
determined for individual hypotheses or parts of the same as well as for certain questions; this, 
too, can be seen as a manifestation of rule adjustment which has been given too little attention in 
the literature on methodology so far (cf. an approach to this in Rustemeyer 1992,87ff.). 
This understanding of flexibility and rule adjustment, however, presupposes that a system 
of categories is required and elaborated as the essential core of a content analysis; such a system 
operationalizes the respective central thematic aspects of meaning. Doing without such an 
elaboration of a system of categories "because this manner of proceeding can possibly" lead "to 
abbreviations and exclusions" (Volkmer 1989, 136) implies striving to obtain an overall 
interpretation (of the comprehensive potential meaning of a text), which is really more sympto- 
matic of hermeneutical interpretation (see above, under 1.2) but to our rnind is not compatible 
with a systematic-empirical content analysis. After all, in the framework of empirical methodol- 
ogy, it is accepted as a basic, even almost an axiomatic tenet that there is no method that is able 
to Cover all characteristics of the particular object in question; any systematic-methodical proce- 
dure will always have to emphasize certain features of an object in order to "portray" it as faith- 
fuily as possible (cf. Groeben 1986, 49ff.). In the light of this prerequisite, a system of catego- 
ries for content analysis is not an avoidable lirnitation but only the explicit systematization of the 
focus on characteristic features that is unavoidable anyway. However, one can and should han- 
dle the concrete methodological evaluation criteria established to assess this systematic ap- 
proach with more fexibility than is the case for the classical "strict rule" view of content analysis. 
The latter n o d l y  requires that, alongside theoretical deduction and precision, the individual 
categories have to be mutually exclusive (the criterion of exclusion or rather disjunction) and 
that the whole system of categories should be both exhaustive and saturated (cf. Lisch and Kriz 
1978, 70ff.; Rust 1981, 112ff.; Merten 1983, 95ff.). This means that a single unit of analysis 
may only be subsumed under one and not under several categories, that all parts of the text have 
to be covered by the system of categories ("exhaustiveness"), and also that all categories must 
be filled up with any relevant units of analysis ("saturation"). As far as the last two criteria go, it 
is relatively easy to fulfil the requirement of "exhaustiveness" by introducing a residual category, 
even if, obviously, the latter should not be too big (Rustemeyer 1992, 104ff.). The criterion of 
saturation is not very useful, especially when employing content analysis to test theory-driven 
hypotheses, because this can always result in categories established by deduction which are per- 
haps not (yet) saturated by using a certain corpus of texts (ibid.). Nor should the criterion of the 
exclusivity of categories be mechanically maintained in the light of flexible rule adjustment, be- 
cause in the case of certain questions or possible hypotheses it is quite probable that individual 
units of analysis contain different aspects of meaning (ibid., 107ff.). 
Therefore, in the case of a flexible approach to content analysis, at the most, the criterion 
of exclusivity can and should only be upheld with regard to specific hypotheses. At least the 
partial dropping of the criterion of exclusivity also makes it possible to include more complex 
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structures of meaning, the linkage of aspects of meaning, and so On. in the methodical and sys- 
tematic procedures of content analysis - however, of Course, only to the extent that in this way 
the intersubjectivity of the method (e.g., in the shape of inter-coder reliability) is not lost. This 
combination of a liberalization of the requirement of exclusivity and the maintenance of the in- 
tersubjectivity criterion thus demonstrates with the greatest possible clarity the kind of rule ad- 
justment suggested here as a way of optirnizing the methodical systematic approach and (sense- 
oriented) relevante and substantiality in content analysis. 
3.3 Explication of Inferences: Exemplarity and Validity 
As was elucidated in general terms above, the target idea of explicating inferences certainly does 
embrace the concept that broader inferences which go beyond the sirnply (adequate) decoding 
of the linguistic information contained in a text are significant and desirable - however, only to 
the extent that they can be tied in with a systematic-methodical way of proceeding (in the sense 
of rule adjustment). This quite adequately includes dimensions of meaning which would be de- 
scribed as "latent" by the "qualitative paradigm", as has been pointed out on several occasions in 
the quantity-quality controversy (cf. Groeben 1987, 5ff.; Huber 1989, 39ff.; see 2.2 above). 
These include, for instance, the classical analysis of symbols (cf. Lisch and Kriz 1978, 21f.) as 
well as evaluation analysis (cf. Thonhauser 1989, 73ff.), which can be used (directly or possibly 
also indirectly) to Cover the attitudes or judgments expressed in a text. Above and beyond this, 
these broader inferences can also exist in a critical evaluation on the part of the subject of cog- 
nition, e.g., along the lines of a content analysis that criticizes ideology (Ritsert 1972), where 
certain linguistic-semantic or pragmatic characteristics of texts are classified and then criticized 
as indicators, for instance, of dogmatic or ideological thinking (cf. exarnples of both in Vorderer 
and Groeben 1987). In particular, this inclusion of possible evaluations, either as an object (i.e., 
evaluations on the part of the producer of the text), or as criticism on the part of the researcher 
do represent an approximation of the "qualitative paradigm" in that the representative nature of 
random samples which was vital in the first phase of mass communication research loses some 
of its importance. Instead of this, what is much more at stake here is exemplarity, which means 
having recourse to prototypical or rather ideally typical cases (cf. Larnnek 1988, 173ff. and, in 
its basic argument, the early book of Holzkamp 1964). 
In relation to the validity of these broader inferences, in the case of classical Symbol and 
evaluation analysis, the crucial problem is the adequate linguistically immanent explication and 
justification of the conclusions (in the sense of the semantics of meaning), which is to be secured 
by the accuracy, appropriateness, exhaustiveness, and so on of the definition of categories. 
Hence, in empirical-scientific methodology, the aspect of so-called content validity was thus 
characterized and described in concrete terms in connection with content analysis by Krippen- 
dorff (1980) as "semantic validity" (for which he also suggested specific testing methods, rang- 
ing from expert ratings right down to the construction of hypothetical sections of text). Espe- 
cially the prospect of criticism (starting from the subject of cognition) does, however, clearly 
point to the fuzzy transition towards broader inferences, particularly in the direction of the 
author's characteristics. When bringing out the attitudes and evaluations contained in the text, 
these can actually usually be attributed to the respective author as personal traits of the text 
producer; when the researcher is critically assessing certain acts of cognition, attitudes, and so 
forth in the framework, say, of a content analysis that criticizes ideology, this (attributional) 
implication is in fact virtually inevitable - at least as long as certain situational aspects of com- 
munication are not mentioned as being more important conditions. In both cases, both that of an 
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inference about the author's traits and about the conditions of the Setting, it is necessary to give 
the most explicit possible designation and (theoretical) derivation of these inferences; then the 
next step quite consistently implies testing their validity, for which purpose aspects of "sernantic 
validity" are no longer sufficient. To achieve this, the concepts of criterion validity and construct 
validity developed in general empirical-scientific methodology should then be used accordingly. 
In the case of criterion validity, the conclusions derived from indicators in the text and then 
deduced about the author's and the setting's characteristics need to be validated by means of an 
explicit further step in the testing process, using a suitable external criterion; in so doing, the 
possibilities of simultaneous ("concurrent") or rather predictive validity already developed can 
be used. For instance. if you draw conclusions from certain indicators in the text about dogma- 
tism, this can then be confirmed by rneans of an explicit test on the dogmatic attitude of the 
authors of the text (e.g.. by using a questionnaire on dogmatism) (cf. Günther 1987); or it can 
be predicted on the basis of certain "dogmatizing" situational conditions (such as, say, that of a 
rninority position that can be observed empirically) and from the particularly frequent occur- 
rence of the relevant linguistic indicators (ibid.). And just as such approaches with regard to 
criterion validation can be used for the explicit testing of inferences that go beyond the text in 
content analysis, in the Same way this also applies to the concept of construct validation (Lisch 
and Kriz 1978, 1Olff.; Merten 1983, 309ff.). Construct validation implies integration in a no- 
mological network, i.e., the linking up with other hypotheses or laws that have already been 
tested empirically and have (relatively speaking) been proved right. Thus, for instance, in reader 
research in developmental psychology it is considered to be a well-established result when girls 
(especially with regard to their processing of literary texts) at junior high school are psychologi- 
cally ahead of boys. Now if Lange and Willenberg (1989) do a content analysis on the interpre- 
tative text work of pupils on preselected literary texts (on which they had to answer Open ques- 
tions and imagine sequels to the Story, and so on) in terms of the quality of their understanding 
of the text, by this means it is possible to test the validity of the System of categories developed 
for this purpose by comparing and validating the construct on the basis of the known differente 
in the understanding competence of girls as opposed to boys (ibid., 185). 
There is an even greater necessity for explicit testing of criterion validation or construct 
validation by further research steps with regard to inferences about the recipient, i.e., especially 
about the effects of texts; this necessity has been cogently argued for again and again (cf. Früh 
1989, 45ff.; Rust 1981, 67ff.) and also proved empirically (cf. the Summary by Groeben and 
Vorderer 1988, 230ff.). For the cognitive constructiveness of the reader, whether male or fe- 
male, discussed above means that the reception of the text and its effect in fact do not only de- 
pend on the content of the text or on the "message" the text contains and therefore cannot be 
(sufficiently) clarified just by describing this message (cf. Vorderer and Groeben 1987; Ruste- 
meyer 1992, 140ff.). "In order to test the effects" at all events "a content analysis of the text 
must be followed by the questioning of the reader, listener, or viewer, which then reveals the 
reaction to the text" (Rust 1981, 68). The "message" contained in a text and reconstructed by 
using content analysis can therefore only be understood and characterized as a "potential for 
effect" (Groeben and Vorderer 1988, 222ff.) on the basis of which it is certainly possible to 
draw hypothetical conclusions about imaginable effects, but which need to be tested by using 
additional research steps in the field of criterion or contruct validation. Thus, as much as content 
analysis gains in the way of theoretical "breadth or "depth" by means of conclusions about the 
author, Situation or recipient (including possible effects on the latter), to the Same extent, it has 
to be remembered that the validity of these inferences needs to be secured through additional 
validation steps (cf. Früh 1989, 49f.; Groeben and Vorderer 1988, 231ff.; Rustemeyer 1992, 
140ff.). So within a nondichotomizing concept of content analysis, explicating inferences not 
322 Norbert Groeben and Ruth Rustemeyer 
oniy means the explicit derivation and formulation of these theoretical conclusions but also an 
additional explicit testing of their validity. To circumvent the danger of overinterpretation in 
content analysis, we advise that the definition should not be too wide, i.e., should concentrate 
on the "depiction" of this "message", as does the explication given by Rustemeyer (1992, 13), 
for instance: "the intersubjective allocation of certain parts of a text to certain aspects of mean- 
ing airning at a systematic synoptic description of the meaning of a text." This in no way alters 
the fact that as a rule this "meaning" will also include inferences about cornrnunicators, situa- 
tions, and effects, which, however, need to be validated in the way discussed above. 
4 On the Link Between Methodical Systematics and Object 
Adjustment as a Way of Reconciling the Quantitative and the 
Qualitative Paradigm 
The vital part of any constructive approach to content analysis thus consists in the area of inter- 
section between so-called quantitative and qualitative content analysis, an area that constitutes 
the optimization of methodical systematization and a justified breadth of inferences. To our 
rnind this area of intersection is the core meaning of a constructive interpretation of "content 
analysis", also and most especially as a link between hermeneutical and empirical scientific 
structures. This means that the extreme positions in the quantity-quality controversy and thus 
what is usually understood by "quantitative" versus "qualitative" content analysis are, at most, 
the marginal aspects of meaning of the concept of "content analysis"; these extreme positions 
can (still) be called "content analysis"; however, they do not make (full) use of the rnain capacity 
of the content-analysis method. On the one hand, this applies to the Limitation to manifest di- 
mensions of meaning (i.e., the narrow-inference version of method). which for certainly more 
than just historical reasons should continue to be termed "content analysis". However, this 
should be done with the awareness that by this means the actual capacity of the procedure is not 
fully realized, since overemphasis on the factor of method precludes the possibility of interaction 
between method and object. In a complementary manner, this also applies to the other end of 
the spectrum, to so-called qualitative content analysis, in which in principle only subjective 
processing perspectives are brought in and used heuristically because of the complete variability 
of rules; again, this procedure can also (still) be called "content analysis", in full awareness of 
the fact, however, that here, in the effort to obtain maximum appropriateness vis-h-vis the ob- 
ject, the factor of methodical systematization is insufficiently represented. 
Contrary to this, the above-mentioned core meaning of the concept of "content analysis" as 
a System of rule adjustment with elaborating inferences can achieve optimum interaction be- 
tween the object and the methods, a position from which it is also possible to reject the unjusti- 
fied (mutual) accusations raised in the name of the two contrary methodological paradigms. 
With regard to the "quantitative" paradigm, we are dealing here with the devaluation of content 
analysis in comparison with standardized observation methods (such as questionnaires). Here, 
the position of Lisch and Kriz (1978, 31) should be given emphatic support, which states that 
such a standardization of interview and questionnaire certainly does not convey greater meth- 
odological dignity: "The very term categories of answers ... makes it clear that greater stan- 
dardization of questionnaires only place the share content analysis has in the research process at 
its beginning ... To this extent the increasing preference given to standardized interviews and 
questionnaires is not, as is thought, a step towards a more scientific approach, but rather 
On the Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Methodological Paradigms 323 
(through the Substitution of an explicit content analysis by an implicit content analysis done be- 
forehand) amounts to a loss of objectivity and testability in the interest of having less work to do 
and using available Computer programs in the framework of traditional data processing." How- 
ever, the devaluation of quantitative analysis by the "qualitative" paradigm should be rejected 
just as clearly. As has been argued on several occasions (cf. Lisch and Kriz 1978, 48ff.; Früh 
1989, 31ff.; also see section 2.1 above) quantitative analysis is only a (positive) manifestation of 
the systematic explication and use of the respective content analytical system of categories. The 
content-based, theoretical (and if you like, the "qualitative") substance of a given concrete con- 
tent-analytical procedure (and thus its object appropriateness) is to be Seen in the elaboration 
and justification of inferences and the application of the system of categories in the form of rule 
adjustment. Once "substantial" data have been collected in this way, no subsequent quantitative 
analysis can in any way change the substance of these data (and above all cannot result in any 
reductions); on the contrary, this facilitates achieving the goal mentioned at the beginning of this 
paper, i.e., avoiding qualitative distortion and making it possible to obtain a quantitative synop- 
sis. To this extent (and especially for the central area of rule adjustment with explicative infer- 
ences in content analysis), the (quantitative) statistical models that have been developed and 
introduced up until now are entirely usable. And so this link between quantitative and qualitative 
characteristics in content analysis can serve as a constructive exarnple for a synthesis between 
qualitative and quantitative target criteria, which can, and of Course, must be worked out in 
concrete terms for other methods and methodological paradigms. 
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